Modern


 * Definition and Etymology**

The contemporary definition of modern finds its roots in middle French around the 14th century, where it was defined as "of or relating to the present and recent times, as opposed to the remote past" (OED 2012, A.2a).As a concept, modern refers to the philosophical school that features "a strong commitment to scientism, and objective, morally neutral, universal knowledge " (Lucaites, Condit, Caudill 1999, p 11). The modern worldview treats the universe as "relatively simple, stable, highly ordered", where disagreement is "treated as an unnecessary pathology that arises primarily from ignorance and irrationality" (Lucaites, Condit, Caudill 1999, p 11). Modern is often put into contrast with postmodern in terms of schools of philosophical thought.


 * Philosophical Roots and Connection to Communication Studies**

Modernism draws heavily from Enlightenment era philosophy to establish a basis for scientific rationality. The empirical tradition starts with Descartes (Discourses 1965, Principles 1983), who uses skepticism as a tool by which to challenge his sense perceptions and determine what is true. Philosophers such as David Hume and Immanuel Kant, who focus on reason as a driving goal, also influence modern thought. Positivism, however, has a strong influence on communication studies. As philosophers moved away from the Enlightenment, positivism filled a gap. Based in part off of the work of Ludwig Wittgenstein (among others), the logical positivists argued for a world-view that was "the totality of facts" (Wittgenstein 2010, 1.11). Several positivists were also concerned with determining what Bertrand Russell called "a logically perfect language" (Russell 2010, p 7) and the determination of a logically sound form of symbolism by which to communicate.

The field of communication studies reflected this desire early in its history. Gehrke argues that "appeals to scientific method and social scientific theories often dominated the early speech communication scholarship" with a particular emphasis on the sciences (Gehrke 2009, p 18). Science held "the dominant position in the budding discipline" of speech communication, and with science came reason. Early scholars in the field emphasized the connection between public speaking and logical reasoning as well (Gehrke 2009, p 31). Peters (1989) also notes that mass communication features an emphasis on empiricism; major intellectual figures such as John Dewey sought to use newspapers as a way by which to shape society and make it "a knowable totality" (Peters 1989, p 254). Later communications scholars, notably Chaim Perelman (1969, 1982) rejected strict forms of positivism, and even scholars in the early field were not strictly dedicated to positivism, viewing logic and science as a way to bolster the legitimacy of the discipline (Gehrke 2009, p 20).


 * Relationship to Rhetorical Studies**

Some rhetorical scholars in the 20th century advocate the use of rhetoric as a means by which to improve rational thinking (Fisher 1999, p265-266, Gehrke 2009 p18, Richards 1936). Beyond this, however, rhetoric serves as a way by which to reconcile ambiguity in human communication with a commitment to rational thought (Perelman 1982).

In the Philosophy of Rhetoric (1936), I.A. Richards presents rhetoric as a tool by which scholars can study "misunderstandings and [their] remedies" (1936, p 3). Richards situates rhetoric as "a philosophic discipline aiming at a mastery of the fundamental laws of the use of language" and advocates for the use of context as a means by which to evaluate the meaning of words. Here, Richards advocates for what he calls the "Context Theorem in Meaning", a way by which the context of a word (1936, p 34), the sentence which the word resides in (1936, p 47) and the psychological associations that a person draws from a word (1936, p 63) can provide context for that word. The fundamental goal of the Context Theorem in Meaning is to reduce misunderstandings and clarify communication.

The universal audience, as described by Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca (1969, p 31), was a way to check relativism; in particular, arguments to the universal audience must "convince the reader that the reasons adduced are of a compelling character, that they are self-evident, and possess an absolute and timeless validity, independent of local or historical contingencies" (1969, p 32). Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca argue that "audiences are not independent of one another" and "audiences pass judgment on each other" as a way by which to make the strongest possible arguments (1969, p 35). Perelman also argues that "rhetorical discourse is essential in order to introduce some rationality into the exercise of the individual and the collective will" (1982, p 155). Perelman rejects the Cartesian sense of self-evidence as a way by which to determine knowledge and suggests rhetoric as an alternative on the grounds that philosophical arguments are based in pluralism and require rhetoric to be communicated (1982, p 160). In sum, "[t]o the extent that philosophers appeal to reason and use... they must broaden their conception of reason so as to demonstrate the rationality of argumentative techniques and rhetoric, as a theory of persuasive discourse" (1982, p 161).

Farrell (1976) asks "if all knowledge must rest on some sort of human consensus... [w]hat functional characterization of knowledge is appropriate to the art of rhetoric" (1976, p 4). Farrell concludes that this characterization must take the form of social knowledge, which consists of "conceptions of symbolic relationships among problems, persons, interests and actions which imply (when accepted) certain notions of preferable public behavior" (1976, p 4). Central to social knowledge is the idea of consensus, and that consensus is "necessary" for rhetoric to be impactful. In this interpretation, rhetoric depends on social knowledge in order to be effective; that social knowledge serves as the "assumption of a wider consciousness" (1976, p 13) and ties back into the goal of the modern to find universal knowledge.

Written by David Tokarz (August 2012).

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 * References**

Descartes, R. (1968). //Discourse on Method and the Meditations//. (F. E. Sutcliffe Trans.). Middlesex, England: Penguin Books.

-- (1983). //Principles of Philosophy//. (R. P. Miller and V. Roger, trans). Dortrecht, Holland: Reidel.

Farrell, T. (1976). Knowledge, Consensus and Rhetorical Theory. //Quarterly Journal of Speech, 62//(1). 1-14.

Gehrke, P. J. (2009). //The Ethics and Politics of Speech: Communication and Rhetoric in the Twenty-First Century.// Carbondale, IL: Southern Illinois University Press.

Fisher, W. R. (1999). Narration as a Human Communication Paradigm: The Case of Public Moral Argument. In J. L. Lucaites, C. M. Condit, S. Caudill (Eds.) //Contemporary Rhetorical Theory: A Reader.// New York: Guilford Press. 265-287.

Lucaites, J. L., C. M. Condit. (1999). Introduction. In J. L. Lucaites, C. M. Condit, S. Caudill (Eds.) //Contemporary Rhetorical Theory: A Reader//. New York: Guilford Press.1-18.

Modern (2012). The Oxford English Dictionary. Retrieved (2012, August 2) from []

Richards, I.A. (1938). //The Philosophy of Rhetoric.// London: Oxford University Press.

Perelman, C and L. Olbrechts-Tyteca. //The New Rhetoric//. Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame.

Perelman, C. (1982). //The Realm of Rhetoric.// Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame.

Peters, J. D. (1989). Satan and Savior: Mass Communication in Progressive Thought. //Critical Studies in Mass Communication, 6,// 247-263.

Russell, B. (2010) Introduction. In L. Wittgenstein, //Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus// (pp 7-19). Project Gutenberg. Retrieved from []

Wittgenstein, L. (2010). //Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus.// (C. K. Ogden Trans.). Project Gutenberg. Retrieved from []